Rubi and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
Date: 1 July 2026 | Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 4846 of 2026 | Bench: J.J. Munir and Achal Sachdev, JJ.
Facts: Police and a Child Line team went to stop the proposed marriage of a 16-year-old Muslim girl in Bulandshahr. Nineteen persons allegedly obstructed the officials and removed the girl from the team’s custody. They sought quashing of the FIR, arguing that under Muslim personal law a girl attaining puberty could marry.
Issue: Whether Muslim personal law permitting marriage after puberty can prevail over the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA) and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO).
Decision: The Division Bench refused to quash the FIR. It held that personal law cannot override statutory child-protection laws. The Court observed that the PCMA prescribes the applicable age of marriage irrespective of religion and that sexual relations with a person below 18 attract POCSO protection. The judgment therefore gives strong statutory primacy to child-protection legislation over a personal-law rule based on puberty. It also highlighted the constitutional importance of protecting children’s autonomy, dignity and childhood, while noting that wider questions concerning the PCMA’s interaction with personal laws may require legislative or constitutional consideration.
Tayyab v. State of U.P. and Others
Date: 1 July 2026 | Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 8465 of 2026 with connected petitions | Bench: J.J. Munir and Tarun Saxena, JJ.
Facts: The petitioners sought quashing of an FIR alleging serious sexual offences, including offences against a woman who was a minor during an earlier alleged incident and subsequent sexual violence connected with purported nikah halala. The petitioners argued that the allegations arose in a personal-law context and sought interference at the investigation stage.
Issue: Whether personal-law practices can provide a basis for quashing criminal proceedings where the allegations disclose offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and POCSO Act, 2012.
Decision: The Division Bench dismissed the connected writ petitions and declined to terminate the investigation. It held, in substance, that personal law cannot operate as a shield against penal statutes. Where allegations, taken at face value, disclose cognizable offences, the High Court should not ordinarily short-circuit the investigation under its writ jurisdiction. The decision reinforces the distinction between recognition of personal-law institutions and exemption from criminal law: statutory offences remain governed by Parliament’s penal framework. The ruling is significant for the interaction between personal law, child protection and the High Court’s limited interference at the FIR stage.
Anshu Shukla and Another v. Union of India and Another
Date: 7 July 2026 | Writ-C No. 6292 of 2026 | Bench: Shekhar B. Saraf and Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary, JJ.
Facts: A married couple had undergone IVF treatment and preserved three embryos in July 2015, before the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 came into force. When the couple later sought altruistic surrogacy, the wife had crossed the statutory upper age of 50 years. They challenged the application of the statutory age restriction to their pre-existing embryos.
Issue: Whether the age restriction under Section 4(iii)(v)(c)(I) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 could be applied retrospectively to a couple whose surrogacy process had commenced through embryo creation and freezing before the Act.
Decision: The Court held that rigid retrospective application of the age restriction would infringe reproductive autonomy, recognised as part of personal liberty under Article 21. Since the couple had initiated the relevant process before the Act came into force, the statutory age bar was held inapplicable to them. The Court permitted them to proceed with the surrogacy process and directed them to approach the competent authority/Chief Medical Officer, Lucknow, for a reasoned decision. Importantly, the judgment did not abolish the statutory age limit generally; it limited its retrospective application in the circumstances before the Court.
The Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Smt. Rachna Singh and Others
Date: 31 July 2026 | Writ-C No. 16530 of 2026 | Bench: Saral Srivastava and Garima Prashad, JJ.
Facts: Smt. Rachna Singh was awarded ₹5 lakh under the Mukhyamantri Kisan Evam Sarvhit Bima Yojna after the accidental death of her husband, Bhanu Pratap Singh. The insurer challenged the District Magistrate’s award under Article 226, relying on alleged contractual and procedural objections under its arrangement with the State Government.
Issue: Whether an insurer can invoke writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to obstruct a beneficiary’s welfare compensation by relying on disputes arising from its contractual arrangement with the State.
Decision: The Division Bench dismissed the insurer’s writ petition. It held that the welfare scheme is a social-security measure, not an ordinary commercial insurance contract, and that the beneficiary’s entitlement arises from the scheme rather than the insurer-State contractual arrangement. The insurer could not use Article 226 to delay payment after the competent authority had determined eligibility, particularly when no jurisdictional error, perversity or manifest illegality was shown. The Court directed release of the ₹5 lakh compensation within three months, while leaving the insurer free to pursue any contractual grievance against the State before an appropriate forum.
State of U.P. and 3 Others v. Raj Narain Yadav, Constable
Date: July 2026 | Special Appeal concerning disciplinary dismissal after criminal conviction | Bench: J.J. Munir and Indrajeet Shukla, JJ.
Facts: Raj Narain Yadav, a police constable, had been convicted in a criminal case involving dowry-related and other serious offences. The disciplinary authority dismissed him from service on the basis of the conviction. A Single Judge later set aside the dismissal and directed reconsideration, observing that the authority had not adequately examined the conduct leading to the conviction.
Issue: Whether a criminal conviction by itself automatically requires dismissal from service, or whether the disciplinary authority must independently consider the conduct underlying the conviction and the proportionality of punishment.
Decision: The Division Bench dismissed the State’s special appeal. It affirmed that dismissal cannot be treated as an automatic consequence merely because a conviction exists. The disciplinary authority must consider the conduct that resulted in the conviction and determine the appropriate punishment in accordance with law. The Court also emphasised restraint in intra-court appellate review where the Single Judge’s view is plausible and reasonable. The ruling reinforces proportionality and fairness in public-service discipline, particularly under Article 311(2) and the applicable U.P. Police disciplinary rules.
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