Case Name: Santosh Gurung v State of Sikkim

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 107 of 2018 Judgment Date: 1 October 2026

Coram: Justice Atul S. Chandurkar Appellant: Santosh Gurung Respondent: State of Sikkim

Relevant Provisions: Sections 376(2)(i), 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860; Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

Nature of Case: Criminal Appeal against conviction for rape, murder and disappearance of evidence

Decision: Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; appellant acquitted

Santosh Gurung v State of Sikkim concerned the conviction of the appellant, Santosh Gurung, for offences under Sections 376(2)(i), 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence, as there was no eyewitness to the alleged incident. The Sessions Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to life imprisonment, and the High Court of Sikkim affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court examined whether the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution formed a complete and conclusive chain pointing only towards the guilt of the appellant. The Court held that the chain of circumstances was incomplete and contained several serious gaps. Consequently, the conviction could not be sustained and the appellant was acquitted.

On 6 November 2013, at approximately 9:00 a.m., the appellant was asked by his mother to purchase vegetables. The appellant allegedly asked his maternal niece, the victim, to accompany him. His mother did not permit the victim to go with him. According to the prosecution, the appellant nevertheless took the victim from the house. When the appellant and the victim did not return, the family searched for them. A Missing Report was lodged at Rongli Police Station on 12 November 2013 concerning both the victim and the appellant.

The appellant was subsequently traced at Siliguri. According to the prosecution, while he was being brought back to Rongli, he allegedly stated that he had raped the victim and thereafter throttled her to death on 6 November 2013. An FIR was registered on 13 May 2014 and investigation followed. The prosecution filed a chargesheet and examined sixteen witnesses. The appellant denied the allegations and maintained that he was innocent.

The Sessions Court, by judgment dated 20 April 2016, convicted the appellant. He was convicted under the IPC provisions relating to rape, murder and causing disappearance of evidence, as well as under Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The High Court of Sikkim, exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, re-appreciated the evidence and affirmed the conviction. The appellant consequently approached the Supreme Court.

The prosecution relied upon several circumstances: the alleged “last seen” evidence, recoveries under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, DNA evidence relating to bones and hair, the Forensic Science Laboratory report, recovery of a brown shawl allegedly connected with the victim, and the appellant’s answers under Section 313 of the Code.

The appellant argued that none of these circumstances established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In particular, the witnesses were uncertain about whether he was actually the last person seen with the victim; the recovery was from a place accessible to members of the public; the DNA and FSL reports did not connect him with the offence; and the prosecution had failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances. The State, on the other hand, argued that the circumstances

collectively established the appellant’s involvement and that his failure to provide satisfactory explanations under Section 313 strengthened the prosecution’s case.

  1. Whether the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution formed a complete and unbroken chain establishing the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
  2. Whether the alleged “last seen” evidence, recoveries under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, DNA and FSL reports, recovery of the brown shawl, and the appellant’s statement under Section 313 CrPC were sufficient to connect the appellant with the rape and murder of the victim?
  3. Whether the conviction could be sustained when the prosecution evidence did not exclude reasonable possibilities consistent with the appellant’s innocence?

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of both the Sessions Court and the High Court. It held that the prosecution had failed to establish the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court emphasised that where a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, every circumstance relied upon by the prosecution must be firmly established and all such circumstances must form a complete chain pointing exclusively towards the guilt of the accused. The circumstances must also exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.

First, the Court found the last-seen theory doubtful. PW2, the victim’s grandmother, was uncertain whether the appellant and victim had left the house together or separately. PW1 admitted that no witness had seen the appellant taking the victim away. PW3 similarly could not say whether the victim had gone with the appellant or with other persons who had visited the house. The Investigating Officer also admitted that nobody had seen the appellant taking the victim away. Therefore, the prosecution could not establish that the appellant was actually the person last seen with the victim.

The Court further noted the substantial time gap between the alleged last-seen circumstance on 6 November 2013 and the discovery of bones and teeth approximately six months later. Referring to

State of U.P. v Satish, the Court observed that the last-seen theory is ordinarily relevant where the time gap is sufficiently small to make the involvement of another person improbable. A long gap makes reliance upon the theory hazardous in the absence of additional positive evidence.

Second, the Court examined the recoveries under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The articles were recovered from an area that was not a thick jungle and was frequently visited by persons collecting fodder and grazing cattle. The Court clarified that the mere fact that a place is accessible to others does not automatically make a Section 27 recovery inadmissible. The important question is whether the article was ordinarily visible or remained concealed from public view. Since the circumstances surrounding the recovery required caution, the Court found that this evidence could not safely establish the appellant’s guilt.

Third, the DNA evidence did not support the prosecution. The recovered bone pieces were identified as being of human male origin, whereas the victim was female. They also did not show a biological relationship with the blood samples of the victim’s mother and sister. The prosecution therefore failed to establish that the recovered bones and teeth belonged to the victim. The Court consequently held that the DNA report could not be relied upon as a circumstance against the appellant.

Fourth, the FSL report was inconclusive. The analyst could not determine whether the dried blood on the brown shawl was human or animal blood. The origin and age of certain hair could not be established, and human remains were not detected in the soil sample. Thus, the FSL evidence did not materially advance the prosecution’s case.

Fifth, the alleged brown shawl also failed to establish a connection between the appellant and the crime. The victim’s mother could not identify the shawl or confirm that it belonged to her. The Investigating Officer also admitted that it did not belong to the appellant’s mother, despite the appellant allegedly stating otherwise. The prosecution also had no witness who had seen the appellant obtaining the shawl.

Finally, the Court considered the appellant’s statement under Section 313 CrPC. It held that such a statement cannot be used to fill gaps in the prosecution’s evidence. Failure by an accused to provide an explanation may operate as an additional link only where the prosecution has already

established the incriminating circumstances. It cannot shift the fundamental burden of proof from the prosecution to the accused. Since the prosecution had failed to establish a complete chain, the appellant’s answers under Section 313 could not be treated as an additional incriminating circumstance.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to establish the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The alleged last-seen circumstance was doubtful, the Section 27 recovery required caution, the DNA evidence actually indicated that the recovered bones were of male origin, the FSL report was inconclusive, and the brown shawl did not establish any reliable connection with the appellant. Since these circumstances did not form a complete chain pointing exclusively towards his guilt, his statement under Section 313 CrPC could not cure the deficiencies in the prosecution case.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed and set aside the judgment of the Sessions Court and the judgment of the High Court of Sikkim. The appellant was acquitted of all offences for which he had been tried and convicted and was directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. The criminal appeal was consequently allowed.

REFERENCES

  1. Hanumant v State of Madhya Pradesh 1952 INSC 41.
  2. State of Uttar Pradesh v Satish 2005 INSC 68.
  3. State of Himachal Pradesh v Jeet Singh 1999 INSC 104.
  4. Raj Kumar Singh @ Raju @ Batya v State of Rajasthan 2013 INSC 313.
  5. Santosh Gurung v State of Sikkim 2026 INSC 1073.

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