Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Trust v. HDFC Bank Limited & Ors. (2026)
Date of Judgment: 9 June 2026
Bench: Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan
Facts
The Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Trust instituted a defamation suit seeking damages of ₹1,000 crore against HDFC Bank Limited, its Managing Director and other officials. The Trust alleged that public statements and communications issued by the Bank concerning loan recovery proceedings and disputes involving the Trust were false, defamatory and had seriously damaged its reputation.
Along with the suit, the Trust sought an interim injunction restraining the Bank from issuing any further statements concerning the dispute until the final disposal of the case.
Issue
Whether the public statements issued by HDFC Bank constituted prima facie defamation and whether the Trust was entitled to an interim injunction restraining the Bank from making further statements pending disposal of the suit.
Decision
The Bombay High Court dismissed the application for interim relief and imposed costs of ₹5 lakh on the Trust. The Court held that the Bank’s statements were prima facie supported by the available material and were issued as a legitimate response to allegations already circulating in the public domain. It observed that restraining a regulated financial institution from making truthful and necessary public disclosures would be contrary to law.
Accordingly, the Court refused to grant an interim injunction.
Principles laid down
- Truth supported by evidence is a complete defence to a claim of defamation.
- Statements made bona fide and in the public interest are entitled to legal protection.
- Interim injunctions in defamation matters should be granted only in exceptional cases where a strong prima facie case is established.
- Courts must balance the right to reputation with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
Pratiksha Foundation Charitable Trust & Anr. v. FulcrumSec & Ors. (2026)
Date of Judgment: 17 June 2026
Bench: Justice Arif S. Doctor
Facts
Pratiksha Foundation Charitable Trust, which manages thousands of schools in India and abroad, approached the Bombay High Court after a hacking group known as FulcrumSec allegedly gained unauthorised access to its computer systems.
The hackers stole sensitive personal information of school children and staff and demanded a ransom of USD 750,000, threatening to publish the data online if the amount was not paid. The Trust sought urgent judicial intervention to prevent the disclosure of the confidential information and to restrain the cybercriminals from further misuse of the stolen data.
Issue
Whether the Court could grant urgent interim protection to restrain cybercriminals from publishing stolen confidential data and direct intermediaries to block the communication channels used for the cyberattack.
Decision
The Bombay High Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction, restraining FulcrumSec and all associated persons from publishing, disclosing or circulating the stolen data. The Court also directed Google and other intermediaries to block the email accounts used by the hackers. It held that immediate judicial intervention was necessary to prevent irreparable harm, especially where sensitive personal information of children was involved.
Principals laid down.
- Courts have the power to grant urgent ex parte injunctions to prevent misuse of stolen confidential digital information.
- The right to privacy extends to the protection of children’s personal data from unlawful disclosure.
- Digital intermediaries may be directed to assist in preventing continuing cyber offences.
- Courts should act swiftly where delay may result in irreparable harm to privacy and confidentiality.
Madhavi Vilas Gosavi v. Rajesh Mishra (2026)
Date of Judgment: 18 June 2026
Bench: Justice Amit Borkar
Facts
The dispute arose from a no-confidence motion moved against an office-bearer of a co-operative housing society under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The controversy centred on whether the statutory requirement of a two-thirds majority had been satisfied. The authorities had ignored the fractional figure while calculating the required majority and upheld the no-confidence motion. The petitioner challenged this computation, contending that the statutory requirement had been incorrectly applied.
Issue
Whether a fractional figure can be ignored while calculating the two-thirds majority required for passing a no-confidence motion against an officer of a co-operative society.
Decision
The Bombay High Court allowed the petition and held that the fractional figure cannot be ignored while computing the statutory two-thirds majority. The Court observed that removal through a no-confidence motion carries serious civil consequences and therefore the statutory provisions governing such removal must be interpreted strictly. Since the prescribed majority had not been validly achieved, the no-confidence motion could not be sustained.
Principles laid down
- Statutory provisions prescribing a special majority must be strictly construed.
- Fractional figures cannot be ignored where the statute requires a two-thirds majority.
- A no-confidence motion affecting an elected office-bearer must strictly comply with the statutory requirements.
- Courts must ensure fairness and procedural compliance before upholding the removal of elected representatives.
Uttan Machimar & Vahatuk Sahakari Society Ltd. & Anr. v. Nitin Jaywant Mhatre (2026)
Date of Judgment: 17 June 2026
Bench: Justice Sandeep V. Marne
Facts
Nitin Jaywant Mhatre was employed as a driver by Uttan Machimar & Vahatuk Sahakari Society Ltd., where he was responsible for transporting women from the Koli community and their fish to the market. A departmental inquiry found that he had repeatedly used abusive and vulgar language against his employer and the women passengers. Based on the inquiry findings, the Society dismissed him from service. The employee challenged the dismissal before the Labour Court and Industrial Court, after which the matter reached the Bombay High Court.
Issue
Whether the employee’s dismissal for using abusive and derogatory language towards his employer and the Koli women was legally justified, and whether the Industrial Court could interfere with the findings of the departmental inquiry.
Decision
The Bombay High Court upheld the dismissal, holding that the employee’s conduct amounted to grave misconduct and justified the disciplinary action taken by the employer. The Court observed that the Industrial Court had exceeded its revisional jurisdiction by reassessing the evidence as if it were hearing an appeal. It restored the employer’s decision, emphasising that judicial interference is limited when a fair departmental inquiry has been conducted.
Principles laid down
- Abusive, vulgar, and derogatory conduct towards co-workers or members of the public constitutes grave misconduct warranting dismissal.
- A valid departmental inquiry is assessed on the preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
- The Industrial Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its own findings unless there is a jurisdictional error or perversity.
- Courts should ordinarily respect disciplinary decisions taken after a fair and lawful inquiry.
Lt. Col. (Retd.) Jaigopal Nagarajan v. Vasudev Mariwala & Anr. (2026)
Facts
The dispute arose under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, where the petitioner challenged the rejection of a revision application on the ground that it had been filed beyond the prescribed limitation period. The principal contention was whether the Revisional Authority had the power to condone the delay beyond the statutory period of 90 days. As conflicting judicial opinions existed on this issue, the matter required authoritative determination.
Issue
Whether the Revisional Authority under Section 44 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 has the jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the prescribed period of 90 days while entertaining a revision application.
Decision
The Bombay High Court held that the issue involved an important question of law affecting the interpretation of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. Instead of deciding the issue itself, the Court referred the matter to a Larger Bench for an authoritative determination. It observed that resolving the conflict in judicial interpretation was essential to ensure uniform application of the law across the State.
Principles laid down
- Where conflicting judicial views exist on a substantial question of law, the matter should be referred to a Larger Bench for authoritative determination.
- Statutory limitation provisions must be interpreted in accordance with legislative intent.
- Courts should promote consistency and certainty in the interpretation of statutory provisions.
- Questions concerning jurisdiction and limitation under special statutes require strict judicial scrutiny.
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