Citation: 2026 INSC 784 (decided 3 August 2026)    |    Coram: Justices Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh

Facts: The complainant alleged that she and the accused had married according to Hindu customs and later lived together; the accused denied a valid marriage. The Karnataka High Court refused to quash criminal proceedings against him under Section 498A IPC, and he approached the Supreme Court arguing that Section 498A applies only where the complainant is a legally wedded wife.

Issue: Whether Section 498A IPC, which penalises cruelty by a “husband,” can extend to a live-in relationship lacking a legally valid marriage.

Decision: The Court held that Section 498A may extend to a live-in relationship that qualifies as a genuine “relationship in the nature of marriage” between consenting adults with an intrinsic intent to marry, though not every live-in relationship would so qualify. It declined to quash the proceedings, while directing strict compliance with the arrest safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, and clarified that this extended interpretation is confined to Section 498A alone.

Citation: 2026 INSC 802 (decided 4 August 2026)    |    Coram: Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran

Facts: The appellant was convicted in 2006 under Sections 302 and 201 IPC for a triple murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. His jail appeal to the Orissa High Court was dismissed in 2016 solely for a 3,157-day delay in filing, without condonation. By the time the matter reached the Supreme Court, he had already spent 22 years in custody.

Issue: Whether the conviction was sustainable on the evidence, and whether the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay in a jail appeal.

Decision: The Court found the conviction rested on a solitary eyewitness it described as unreliable, a confession extracted in breach of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, and a dubious weapon recovery. It set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. It further held that constitutional courts must adopt a liberal, proactive approach to condoning delay in appeals filed by indigent jail convicts, since personal liberty is at stake.

Citation: 2026 INSC 846 (decided 12 August 2026)    |    Coram: Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih

Facts: An FIR was registered under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, arising from a camphor distributorship dispute, after the complainant’s distributorship agreement was terminated. The Jharkhand High Court declined to quash the FIR, holding that a prima facie case existed. The appellants challenged this before the Supreme Court, contending that the dispute was purely commercial.

Issue: Whether the exercise of a contractual power to terminate an agreement, without more, can amount to the offence of cheating.

Decision: The Court held that exercising a contractual power to terminate an agreement is not, by itself, an act of deception; a wrongful termination may find a civil claim for damages but not a criminal charge of cheating unless facts are alleged showing that the termination was part of a dishonest design formed at the very inception of the contract. Finding no such foundational allegation, it quashed the FIR and all consequent proceedings.

Citation: 2026 INSC 843 (decided 12 August 2026)    |    Coram: Justices Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe

Facts: In a family estate dispute involving shares, LLP interests and immovable properties, a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court had granted an interim injunction in 2022. On appeal, a Division Bench set this aside in March 2026 after conducting what the Supreme Court later described as a detailed, twelve-point “mini-trial” on the merits.

Issue: What is the permissible scope of examination for courts deciding, or appellate courts reviewing, applications for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX CPC.

Decision: The Court held that courts at both stages must confine themselves to the three settled requirements — prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury — without embarking on a merits-laden examination of the final controversy. Disapproving the practice of writing lengthy, merits-laden interlocutory orders, it set aside the Division Bench’s judgment and restored the Single Judge’s injunction, clarifying that its own order expressed no opinion on the underlying merits.

Citation: 2026 INSC 897 (decided 20 August 2026)    |    Coram: Nine-Judge Constitution Bench headed by CJI Surya Kant

Facts: A reference pending since 2005 questioned the correctness of the seven-judge ruling in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978), which had laid down an expansive “triple test” to determine what constitutes an “industry” under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The matter was referred to a nine-judge Bench in 2017 and finally argued over three days in March 2026.

Issue: Whether the 1978 triple test required reconsideration, and how “industry” under the new Industrial Relations Code, 2020 ought to be interpreted.

Decision: By a 5:4 majority, the Bench held that parts of the triple test needed refinement, though its basic framework survived; the reformulated test operates prospectively only, while disputes pending under the repealed 1947 Act continue to be governed by the 1978 test. The Court unanimously held that “industry” under the 2020 Code must be construed on its own text, independent of the old jurisprudence.

Citation: 2026 INSC (decided 20 August 2026)    |    Coram: Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran

Facts: Two practising advocates were proceeded against under Sections 2 and 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, arising out of a dispute over Bar Association elections at Fatehgarh, Farrukhabad. The Allahabad High Court declined to quash the proceedings, holding that a prima facie gang chart existed against them.

Issue: Whether the U.P. Gangsters Act creates a distinct, independent penal offence apart from the predicate offences already punishable under the IPC and other statutes.

Decision: The Court held that the Act only defines “gang” and “gangster” and prescribes punishment for that status, without creating any corresponding offence — violating the constitutional guarantee under Article 20(1) that there can be no punishment without an offence created by law. It quashed the proceedings against both advocates, clarifying that independent offences under the IPC or other penal statutes, if made out, may still be separately prosecuted.

Citation: 2026 INSC 920 (decided 25 August 2026)    |    Coram: Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran

Facts: The Department issued a show cause notice to Tata Steel under Section 74 of the CGST Act, 2017, for three financial years, based on audit objections concerning an input tax credit mismatch and alleged short payment of tax, invoking the extended five-year limitation period by reciting fraud, wilful misstatement and suppression. The assesses challenged the notice as being time-barred under the ordinary limitation period.

Issue: Whether the extended limitation period under Section 74 CGST Act can be invoked by merely reciting the statutory expressions fraud, wilful misrepresentation or suppression, without more.

Decision: The Court held that such expressions cannot be mechanically reproduced in a show cause notice to invoke extended limitation; the foundational facts giving rise to the inference of fraud or suppression must be evident from the notice itself. Finding no such foundational facts and the notice issued beyond the ordinary limitation period, the Court set aside the show cause notice and the consequential order, while granting the Department liberty to issue a fresh, properly grounded notice.

This article has been researched and prepared by Moksh Gupta, Legal Research Intern at LegalRath.

Join our WhatsApp Groups ( Click Here) and Telegram Channel ( Click Here) and get instant notifications