Most Important Bombay High Court Judgments of July 2026

July 2026 witnessed significant Bombay High Court judgments concerning constitutional rights, criminal procedure, social justice, land administration and judicial review. The decisions address Supreme Court precedent, externment, hearing before cognizance under Section 223 BNSS, compensation for hazardous sanitation-related deaths, and retrospective application of executive orders.

Mohd. Faheem Sk. Ibrahim Quraishi v. Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee, Nagpur

Facts

Petitioner, a Senior Auditor with Defence Services, challenged the Caste Scrutiny Committee’s order dated 24.11.1998 rejecting his claim to belong to “Bahna”, a Scheduled Caste under Entry 5 of Part X of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. Born a Muslim, his records showed “Muslim-Bahna”. He also challenged Paragraph 3 of the 1950 Order which limits SC status to Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists. The matter remained pending awaiting the Supreme Court’s decision in a similar case.

Issues

1. Whether Paragraph 3 of the 1950 Order, denying SC status to persons professing Islam, violates Articles 14, 15, 16 and 25.

2. Whether the High Court can examine Paragraph 3 despite it being upheld in Soosai v. Union of India, 1985 Supp SCC 590 when a similar challenge is pending before a larger SC Bench.

Decision

The High Court dismissed the petition. Under Article 141, Supreme Court law is binding. In Soosai v. Union of India, 1985 Supp SCC 590, Paragraph 3 was upheld. Pendency of Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India (2012) 3 SCC 1 does not exempt the High Court. The Committee’s rejection was upheld. Liberty was granted to seek remedies if law changes. No costs.

Saeed Ahmad Abdul Wahid Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra

Facts

1. Petitioner, Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India, was removed from Mumbai through an order dated 03.12.2025 passed by DCP Zone-6 under the provisions of Section 56(1)(a)(b) of Maharashtra Police Act.
2. Appeal dismissed on 27.03.2026. The basis was FIRs filed mainly under Section 223 of bns for staging agitations/morchas/dharnas against the decisions taken by the Central Government without seeking permission from the Police.
3.  The petitioner has challenged the said externment as being mala fide and infringing upon the fundamental rights.

Issues

Can an externment order according to Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act be issued just for the reason of conducting peaceful protests/dharnas against the decisions of the government, and was the subjective satisfaction based on “threat, danger or harm” lawful?

Decision

The High Court has set aside both the orders of the externment order as well as the appellate order. The High Court said that the provisions of Section 56(1)(a)(b) requires there to be material showing the acts causing alarm, danger or injury to person/property or the commission of any offences relating to the force/violence in subjects under Chapter XI of the BNS, as well as in Chapters V, and VI of the BNS. In this case, the only allegation was that of Section 223 BNS relating to the protests done without taking permission. There was no material to establish subjective satisfaction.

Neville Tuli v. Securities and Exchange Board of India

Facts

1. SEBI filed a petition with the Special Court (SEBI), against the petitioner, Director of Osian’s Connoisseurs of Art Pvt Ltd for an offence under Section 24(2) of the SEBI Act, 1992, for not complying with the refund directions issued regarding the Osian’s Art Fund, a CIS which had been operated without registration.
2.  The Special Court took cognisance of the complaint and issued the process before hearing the accused.
3. The petitioner challenged this order on the grounds of breach of the first proviso of Section 223(1) of the BNSS, 2023, which speaks about providing the accused an opportunity of being heard prior to taking cognizance of the complaint.

Issues

Whether a Special Court set up under the SEBI Act, 1992 shall be obliged to give an opportunity of hearing to the accused under the first proviso to Section 223 BNSS, 2023 before taking notice of offences when the case is instituted by way of complaint.

Decision

The High Court invalidated the cognizance order, stating that the Section 4(2) of the BNSS, 2023 applies to special statutes unless there is an opposite procedure. The Section 26-D of the SEBI Act states that the BNSS applies to Special Courts, which are treated as Courts of Session. The SEBI Act does not contain any provision that excludes the Section 223. The decision was based on the principles laid down in the cases of Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. ED and Parvinder Singh v. ED, where the clause to Section 223 has mandatory and substantive character whereby it provides for the right to hearing prior to cognizance. The Special Court must grant a hearing to the accused person before the cognizance is taken in the case. The case has been sent back for further orders.

Sharda Maroti Chopwad & Anr. V. State of Maharashtra

Facts

1. On 19.09.2021, Maroti Rama Chopwad and Nagesh Vyankati Ghumalwad died due to drowning and asphyxia while cleaning a septic tank on the private property of Respondent No.3 in Nanded.
2. They entered the tank without safety equipment or statutory permission.
3. An FIR was registered under the Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013 (PEMSR Act, 2013).
4. Petitioner No.1 is the wife and Petitioner No.2 is the mother of the deceased. Respondent No.3 paid Rs. 2,25,000 each as compensation. Petitioners claimed Rs. 30,00,000 each with rehabilitation from the State under the PEMSR Act, 2013.
5.  The State contended that liability lies with the private employer.

Issue

1. Whether the State is liable to pay compensation for deaths occurring during hazardous cleaning of septic tanks by privately engaged workers under the PEMSR Act, 2013 and in light of Supreme Court directions in Safai Karamchari Andolan and Balram Singh.

2. Whether the applicable compensation is Rs. 10,00,000 or the enhanced amount of Rs. 30,00,000 as directed by the Supreme Court in Balram Singh, 2023.

Decision

The High Court allowed the petition. Relying on Safai Karamchari Andolan v. Union Of India (2014) 11 SCC 224 and Balram Singh v. Union Of India (2023) 10 SCR 570, the Court held the State is liable to pay Rs. 30,00,000 to each petitioner even for private engagement. The State may recover the amount from Respondent No.3. The Collector was directed to submit proposal within 4 weeks and the State to pay within 8 weeks, failing which 6% interest shall apply.

Dharampal Sharma & Ors. V. State of Maharashtra

Facts

1. The petitioners held a leasehold property in Versova, Mumbai, for 30 years and sought conversion to Occupancy Class – I as per Maharashtra Land Revenue (Conversion) Rules, 2019, and the Collector approved conversion by order passed on April 20, 2021, upon receiving a premium of Rs. 6.39 crores.
2. Later, the Minister cancelled the order in revision by imposing reliance on GR of July 14, 2021, which prohibited conversion of land used for essential services, such as petrol pumps. The sub-lessee, respondent No. 5, oil corporation BPCL, also challenged the order.
3. The petitioners alleged that the GR was applied retrospectively and their vested rights had been denied.

Issues

1. Whether GR dated 14.07.2021 can be applied to nullify conversion order issued on 20.04.2021 under gazette rules call for examination.

2. Whether sub-lessee BPCL has the right to raise objections to conversion between the State and lessee is under question.

Decision

The High Court set aside the order of the minister and confirmed the conversion by the collector. The court stated that the Government Resolution is an executive instruction, and has only prospective application. The words “in future” or “henceforth” do not reflect any intention of retrospective operation. Once the premium is paid, there arises the right under the 2019 Rules which cannot be taken away by an executive order. BPCL does not have any locus because the conversion is between the state and / the lessee; the sub-lease has lapsed and the sub-lessee’s rights are only limited to the structures. The revisional authority has exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 257 of MLRC.

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Editorial Note: This article has been reviewed by the LegalRath Editorial Team to ensure legal accuracy, editorial quality, and clarity before publication.