Section 351 of BNS deals with the offence of criminal intimidation which was earlier defined in Section 503 of IPC. According to the Oxford dictionary, the literal definition of intimidation is “to intimidate someone in order that the other person acts as we desire.” Section 351(1) defines criminal intimidation as threatening another by any means, with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do. The threat can be verbal, written, or conveyed through actions. It also includes a threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested. Thus, the standard offense under Section 351(1) is non-cognizable and bailable.
Section 351(2) of BNS corresponding to Section 506 of IPC states that criminal intimidation is punishable with imprisonment for up to two years or fine or with both. Section 351(3) introduces the aggravated forms and states that if the threat is to cause death, grievous hurt, destruction of property by fire, or to impute unchastity to a woman, the punishment increases up to 7 years, a fine, or both. Section 351(4) addresses anonymous communications and holds anyone taking precautions to conceal one’s identity or location while delivering the threat adds an additional, consecutive penalty of up to 2 years.
Thus, three essential ingredients of criminal intimidation include:
- A threat
- Threat must of injury to person, reputation or property
- The intent to cause alarm or to coerce conduct
Thus, to sustain a charge under Section 351(1) of the BNS, the prosecution must establish these statutory components. The offense is not merely about standard confrontation but it requires a targeted attempt to weaponize fear.
The courts have consistently held that mere abusive language or casual threats are not sufficient to constitute criminal intimidation. The prosecution must prove that the accused intended to cause alarm to the victim. In Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka[1], the Supreme Court held that mere expression of words, without any intention to cause alarm, does not amount to criminal intimidation. The judgment of Manju Ram Kalita v. State of Assam[2] establishes the strict standard of evidence required to prove that verbal threats, petty arguments, or emotional outbursts legally cross the line into criminal conduct. The judiciary clarified that the threat must successfully register in the victim’s mind. If a threat is so absurd or physically impossible that a reasonable person wouldn’t take it seriously, it fails the “intent to cause alarm” test.
Ultimately, Section 351 acts as a vital statutory checkmate, ensuring that personal liberty and free will are protected from the toxic overreach of coercion and fear.
[1] (2015) 7 SCC 423
[2] (2009) 13 SCC 330
